‘Tell It Like It Is’: Information Flow in Logic by Johan van Benthem
  1   
‘Tell It Like It Is’: Information Flow in Logic 
 
Johan van Benthem, Amsterdam & Stanford, http://staff.science.uva.nl/~johan 
 
1  Logic and information flow 
Logic  is  traditionally  taken  to  be  the  systematic  study  of  inference,  drawing  new 
conclusions as a means of elucidating or ‘unpacking’ information that is implicit in the 
given premises. This is the sense in which, for instance, the conclusion B of a typical 
propositional inference ‘from A∨B, ¬A to B’ tells us more about the situations satisfying 
the two premises. Inferences like this drive mathematical proof, automated deduction in 
computers, and the minds of the many people on buses and trains today doing their daily 
Sudoku puzzles, which involve long strings of propositional inferences.  
 
But there is much more to information flow than deduction inside one’s own mind! The 
following list occurs with many authors, going back far into the Western – and the Indian – 
logical tradition. Suppose I want to know if a proposition P is true. Perhaps the easiest way 
of finding out is through observation: I just look at the relevant situation and see if P is the 
case.  Only  if  this  is  not  feasible  for  me,  since  P  is  about  some  remote,  or  otherwise 
inaccessible situation, I might try the option of inference, trying to deduce P or its negation 
from the stock of propositions already at my disposal. Finally, if this second road does not 
help either, I could use a third method, step out of my individual setting, and ask some 
reliable person, turning to multi-agent communication. Thus, information flow involves 
‘social dynamics’: actions by different agents are crucial. The point of this paper is to show 
how all these phenomena fall  squarely within the scope of modern logic, viewed as  a 
general account of information flow. To emphasize the point, asking a question and giving 
an answer is just as ‘logical’ as drawing a conclusion! We will give examples of recent 
developments in this area of ‘logical dynamics’, and point at relevant parts of the literature.  
 
In  particular,  we  will  show  how  mixtures  of  information  are  well  within  the  scope  of 
logical  theory.  In  particular,  one  simple  dynamic  mechanism:  giving  new  information 
through public announcement, gives fresh perspectives on many existing logical topics.  
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2  Epistemic logic: ‘truth to the best of my information’ 
 
Information as range The best-known logical paradigm incorporating a natural semantic 
notion of information is epistemic logic – an approach from philosophy, but nowadays also 
found  in  computer  science  and  economics.  Models  represent  agents’  current  state  of 
uncertainty by means of ‘information ranges’ listing all ways the actual world might be. 
New information will shrink these ranges. E.g., take the inference ‘from A∨B, ¬A to B’ 
once more, but now imagine that the premises come in one by one, starting from an initial 
situation where the agent has no knowledge whatsoever about A and B. Here is how the 
‘updates’ work out for the two premises, ruling out 3 of the 4 options – while we can also 
see that updating with the statement B would not change the information state any more: 
 
   AB   A¬B       AB   A¬B 
             A∨B       ¬A    ¬AB     B    ¬AB 
  ¬AB  ¬A¬B         ¬AB            
 
There are two crucial aspects to this scenario, viz. (a) Statics: what the agent knows or does 
not know at each stage of this process, and (b) Dynamics: the events themselves that trigger 
information flow. We start with task (a), the original focus in logical systems so far. 
 
Logical basics The basic epistemic language describes knowledge in terms of "to the best 
of an agent’s information". The syntax has proposition letters p, q, ..., Boolean connectives 
¬, ∨, and modal operators Kiφ. The latter express that agent i knows that φ, while the dual 
<i>φ = ¬Ki¬φ says that i considers φ possible. Models for the language are triples  
 
M =  (W, {~i | i∈G}, V),  
 
where W is a set of worlds, the ~i are binary accessibility relations between worlds, while   
V is a propositional valuation. The worlds ('states', 'situations', or whatever is relevant to the 
setting) in the set W represent the options for how the actual situation might be, while the 
relations ~i encode the uncertainty, or alternatively, the current information of the agents: 
 
x ~i y says that, at world x, i considers y an option for being the actual world.  
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These accessibility relations may be different for different agents, who need not all have 
the same information. One often takes the ~i to be equivalence relations, but this is not 
crucial, and it does not matter to what follows. In this setting, the semantic truth condition 
for the knowledge operator uses a universal quantifier over the current range:  
 
Agents know what is true throughout their current range of uncertainty: 
  M, s |= Kiφ    iff  for all t with s ~i t: M, t |= φ 
 
The dual <i>φ  is then the existential quantifier 'in some currently accessible world'. We 
will use the 'knowledge' terminology for the operator Kiφ in of what follows. Even so, the 
more  neutral  term  'to  the  best  of  i's  information'  for  Kiφ  states  better  what  the  above 
universal quantification over the current information range really achieves.  
 
Factual  and  higher-order  information  Bringing  in  more  than  one  agent,  the  simple 
epistemic language can formulate complex scenarios. Consider a model for two agents Q, 
A ('questioner' and 'answerer') with one world where the atomic fact P holds, and another 
where P fails. We assume that the real world (there always is one!) is the one indicated by 
the black dot in the picture – though this is an outsider's annotation, rather than the agents' 
own information. Labeled lines linking worlds indicate uncertainties. In particular, Q does 
not know which world is the actual one, while A is better informed: if the actual world has 
P then she knows that is the case, and if it does not, then she know that, too: 
 
 
                 Q                Q            Q 
                       P           ¬P 
     A                 A    M 
                        
 
This diagram also encodes 'higher' information agents have about their own information 
and that of others. E.g., Q knows that she does not know if P, while A does. Hence it would 
be a good idea for Q to ask a question to A, and find out. But before getting to that dynamic 
feature, let us take stock of the model M, i.e., the current state of the informational process. 
In formulas of the epistemic language, the following are true in the world to the left: 
 
  P, KAP, ¬KQP, KQ¬KQP, KQ(¬KQP ∧ ¬KQ¬P) (Q knows that she does  
not know that P), KQ(KAP ∨ KA¬P) (Q knows that A knows whether P)   4   
 
Thus, epistemic logic can express complicated multi-agent patterns. In particular, iterated 
knowledge  about  oneself  and  others  reveal  something  essential  about  the  notion  of 
information as used by humans, keeping our actions grounded in mutual expectations. 
 
Group-level information In addition to describing individual agents and their interactions, 
epistemic logic also has further notions of group knowledge, doing justice to the fact that, 
when individual agents meet, they can form larger groups with new properties of their own. 
In particular, facts stated in public tend to create common knowledge: we all know the 
facts, but also that the others know it, and that they know that we know, and  so on, up to 
any  level  of  iteration. Technically,  this  emergent  form  of  group  knowledge  CGφ  ('φ  is 
common knowledge in group G') is read in the above information models as follows:  
 
M, s |= CGφ iff for all worlds t reachable from s by  
some finite sequence of ~i steps (i∈G): M, t |= φ. 
 
Another  important  epistemic  group  notion  is  distributed  knowledge,  which  describes 
roughly what the group could come to know through internal communication: 
 
  M, s |= DGφ    iff  for all t with s ∩i∈G ~i t: M, t |= φ 
 
Logic as information calculus Next, the valid laws of epistemic logic provide a 'calculus 
of information'. There are many axiomatic systems here, but we just give an illustration. 
Assuming that the accessibility relations are equivalence relations, the complete logic is 
axiomatized by the modal logic S5, on top of any complete classical propositional logic: 
 
  Kj(φ→ψ) →  (Kjφ→Kjψ)    Knowledge Distribution 
  Kjφ → φ        Veridicality 
  Kjφ → KjKjφ        Positive Introspection 
  ¬Kjφ → Kj¬Kjφ       Negative Introspection  
 
The complete system describes agents' own reasoning, but also our reasoning as theorists 
about what they know. Here are the required additional axioms for common knowledge: 
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  CG φ  ↔  φ & EG CG φ    Equilibrium Axiom 
  (φ & CG (φ→EG φ))  → CG φ  Induction Axiom 
 
Here EGφ says that everyone in the group G knows that φ. The complete logic is decidable 
– be it more complex than propositional logic (describing interaction takes its toll). These 
laws can be applied in every concrete scenario, just like the principles of probability theory.  
 
There are many more aspects epistemic logic viewed as a theory of information, including 
the  expressive  power  of  epistemic  languages,  and  the  proper  structural  equivalences 
between information models. Cf. van Benthem 2006A, van der Hoek & Pauly 2006.  
 
3  Dynamic epistemic logic: learning from observation and communication 
 
Structure and process  It is hard to think of information in isolation from the processes 
which create, modify, and convey it. This combination is natural in many disciplines. In 
computer science, one designs data structures in tandem with the processes that manipulate 
them for specific tasks. The same duality occurs in philosophy and linguistics, witness the 
saying  ‘Meaning  Is  What  Meaning  Does'.  We  can  only  give  good  representations  of 
linguistic expressions when we state how these are going to be used: in communication, 
inference, and so on. Thus, structure should always come in tandem with a process! And 
so, which processes drive the notion of information? There is a great variety of candidates: 
computation, inference, update, revision, correction, question answering, communication, 
interaction, games, learning, and so on. Some of these processes concern activities of single 
agents,  while  others  are  multi-agent  'social'  phenomena  –  with  interesting  connections 
between the two, as in the passage from multi-agent argumentation to single-agent formal 
proof. Some of these processes will be mentioned in the sections of this paper. 
 
Questions and answers For a start, as a simplest epistemic process – repeated thousands of 
times throughout our lives –, consider the following conversational scenario: 
 
 (a)  Q asks A the question "P?",   
(b)  A gives the true answer "Yes".  
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Here the situation depicted in the current model M changes, since information will start to 
flow. If this episode is simple cooperative Gricean communication, the question (a) itself 
already conveys new information, viz. that Q does not know the answer, but also, that she 
thinks A might know. In general, this can be highly informative and useful to the answerer. 
Next, the answering event (b) conveys that A knows that P, and its public announcement in 
the group {Q, A} makes sure that Q now also knows that P, that both agents know this 
about each other, and so on to the earlier-mentioned common knowledge. In particular, we 
see that learning both factual and higher epistemic information can be important in multi-
agent communication: an earlier point, but now returning in a dynamic setting. 
 
Information update as model change Our question–answer scenario involves the simplest 
form of information flow, triggered by public announcement !P of some fact P. This covers 
both communicative and single-agent settings, as it applies to both the Observation and 
Communication items on our original list. One can think of !P as a real statement coming 
from some authoritative source in conversation – or more generally, as a totally reliable 
observation  based  on  one's  senses.  (Of  course,  observation  might  also  be  cast  as  a 
conversation between ‘Me’ and ‘Nature’.) If I see that the Ace of Spades is played on the 
table, I now come to know that no one of us holds it any more. Of course, we can be 
mistaken about what we hear or see, but logic starts with first understanding the idealized 
setting. These events !P of incoming new hard information change what I know. Formally, 
they  trigger  changes  in  the  current  epistemic  model.  More  precisely,  !P  eliminates  all 
worlds incompatible with P,  thereby zooming in on the actual situation. Thus the current 
model (M, s) with actual world s changes into its sub-model (M|P, s), whose domain is the 
set {t∈M | M, t |=P}. In a picture, one goes 
 
 
              from M, s         to M|P, s 
                 s          s 
 
   P      ¬P 
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Public announcement logic: compositional analysis of communication  Typically, truth 
values of formulas change in an update step: agents who did not know P now do after !P.  
This leads to subtle phenomena, but one can keep track of them in public announcement 
logic PAL, extending epistemic logic with action expressions: 
 
Formulas     P:  p | ¬φ | φ∨ψ | Kiφ | CGφ  | [A]φ 
Action expressions    A:  !P 
 
The fundamental semantic clause for the dynamic action modality is as follows: 
 
  M, s |= [!P] φ   iff  if M, s |=P, then M|P, s |= φ    
 
Here is the complete calculus of information flow under public announcement: 
 
Theorem 1   PAL is axiomatized completely by the usual laws of  
  Static epistemic logic plus the following reduction axioms: 
  [!P]q    ↔   P →  q     for atomic facts  q 
  [!P]¬φ   ↔   P → ¬[!P]φ  
  [!P]φ∧ψ   ↔   [!P]φ ∧ [!P]ψ 
  [!P]Kiφ   ↔    P → Ki(P → [!P]φ) 
 
This logical calculus highlights basic issues of communication in a very compact format. In 
particular,  the  reduction  axioms  perform  a  step-by-step  compositional  analysis  of  the 
effects  of  arbitrary  assertions,  reducing  them  down  to  plain  epistemic  ones.  Here,  the 
central  axiom  (d)  relates  the  knowledge  agents  have  following  new  information  to 
knowledge they had before. This highlights an important feature of logics of information 
flow, viz. pre-encoding. The current information state M already has the right information 
about knowledge after events !P through relativized knowledge of the form Ki(P →.  
 
Group knowledge Finally, PAL can be extended to deal with common knowledge, but to 
analyze [!P]CGφ we must enrich epistemic logic with a new notion of ‘conditional common 
knowledge’ CG(φ, ψ) which says that φ is true in every world reachable with steps staying 
inside the ψ–worlds.  Then we have the following valid reduction axiom:  
 
  [!P]CG(φ, ψ)  ↔ CG(P ∧ [!P]φ,  [!P]ψ).    8   
 
There  is  much  more  to  be  said  about  this  logical  system  –  for  which  we  refer  to  the 
technical literature. In particular, PAL has a modal bisimulation-based model theory, and it 
raises many new issues of expressive power and computational complexity. We refer to 
van Benthem 2006B, van Benthem, van Eijck & Kooi 2006 for more details about all this. 
 
In what follows, we show how adding a PAL-style component to existing logics leads to 
many new issues and increased modeling power for logical systems. 
 
4  Communication 
PAL itself is the result of adding events of public announcement to an existing system, viz. 
epistemic logic. The resulting calculus of communication and learning raises many issues. 
 
Agent ability and diversity There is still more to axiom (d) than what we said so far. It also 
has a remarkable interchange between two operators: the dynamic [!P] and the epistemic 
Ki.  Such  a  commutativity  law  clearly  fails  for  knowledge  and  action  in  general.  For 
instance, you know right now that after drinking you are terribly boring. But the tragedy of 
life  is  that,  after  drinking,  you  do  not  know  that  you  are  boring...  The  reason  is  that 
drinking,  unlike  mere  observation  or  talk,  impairs  agents’  epistemic  abilities.  More 
precisely,  knowledge  action  interchanges  presuppose  unimpaired  memory,  i.e.,  Perfect 
Recall. Thus, studying information flow immediately raises issues of agent ability. We can 
also describe agents with less idealized properties, including forgetfulness, and even groups 
of agents with different abilities, a reality in real life (van Benthem & Liu 2004, Liu 2006). 
 
Keep talking Other noteworthy features of PAL reside in its further validities. Here is one: 
 
  [!P][!Q]φ    ↔    [!(P ∧ [!P]Q)]φ        # 
 
What this says is that any effect of two consecutive assertions !P, !Q could also have been 
produced by making only one assertion. You may think this is just the conjunction !(P∧Q) 
– but you would be wrong. !P may have changed the current model, so after that, Q may 
have changed its truth value. The more complex equivalence # really gets things right here. 
 
Paradoxes of coming to know What do we learn from a public announcement !P? Is not its 
sole point to produce common knowledge of P? Or, in PAL terms, is the following valid:   9   
 
  [P!]CGP? 
 
This was not on our list of axioms. And indeed, though intuitively plausible at first sight, 
this principle of epistemic action founders on Moore-type statements. Consider this case: 
 
    ¬KyouP  & P     “you do not know it, but P”      
 
This proposition may well be true right now. But once uttered, it will make you know that 
P, and indeed, P becomes common knowledge, invalidating ¬KyouP & P as a whole. Thus, 
announcing a true Moore sentence makes it false in the new information state! Natural self-
refuting cases are ignorance assertions in well-known epistemic puzzles such as ‘Muddy 
Children’. Even so, many assertions do produce common knowledge when announced, but 
it is not known yet precisely which syntactic forms P in public announcements !P produce 
common knowledge – an open logical problem known as the 'Learning Problem'. These 
matters take us right into contemporary epistemology. Consider the simple but exasperating 
Fitch Paradox concerning the Verificationist Thesis “What is true can be known”, or in 
epistemic terms, plus some unspecified modality for the "can" (van Benthem 2004):   
 
  φ →  ◊Kφ.           
 
Fitch gave the following simple but surprising argument showing that the Verificationist 
Thesis is inconsistent. The heart of the problem is again a Moore-style assertion: 
 
    P∧¬KP  →  ◊ K(P∧¬KP) →  ◊ (KP∧K¬KP)  →  ◊ (KP∧¬KP) →  ⊥ 
 
  Therefore, we may conclude that P →  KP, i.e., knowledge and truth would collapse! 
 
Iterated  announcement,  learnability,  and  conversation  We  have  seen  that  no  public 
announcement can make us know a Moore-type proposition. So, what can be learnt in 
principle through single or repeated public announcements of true propositions? There is 
an incipient literature on this. E.g., Miller & Moss 20005 have shown that with repeated 
announcements, complexity of the logic of communication increases considerably. PAL 
with added iteration operators !P
* for arbitrary finite sequences of repetitions of P (as long 
as it is true) is undecidable, non-axiomatizable, and even much worse in complexity. On 
the other hand, Balbiani et al. 2007 have just axiomatized a logic APAL with an added   10   
operator <>φ standing for ‘after some public announcement, φ is the case’ which describes 
effects of future information though without specifying which form it will take. Finally we 
mention  another  recent  development  along  these  lines.  PAL  assumes  that  any  true 
proposition P can be publicly announced by an action !P. But in actual conversation, there 
may  be  restrictions  on  what  can  be  said,  and  in  what  order.  We  can  represent  this  in 
temporal conversation models specifying the admissible sequences of true announcements, 
starting form some initial informational situation. But once we do this, the axioms of PAL 
as they stand will no longer be true. In particular, an existential base principle like  
 
  <!P>T ↔ P 
 
no longer holds – since even when P is true, its announcement may be prohibited by the 
scenario  of  the  model.  (The  direction  from  left  to  right  will  still  hold  in  conversation 
models.)  Thus,  simple  assertions  <!P>T  now  convey  procedural  information  about 
available assertions in the conversation. Therefore, the correct base axiom becomes: 
 
   <!P>q  ↔ <!P>T & q   
 
Using this and similar observations for other reduction axioms, van Benthem, Gerbrandy & 
Pacuit 2007 have shown that the logic of epistemic conversations remains manageable: 
 
Theorem 2  The logic of public announcement over conversation models is decidable. 
 
5  Belief revision 
Doxastic logic In general, there is a conceptual distinction between information coming 
from some source, and agents' attitudes and responses to it. Agents can have other attitudes 
toward  propositions  than  knowledge,  including  belief  or  doubt.  In  particular,  'doxastic 
logics' analyze assertions Biϕ for 'agent i believes that ϕ'. The semantics adds a new idea to 
the information ranges in our epistemic modeling so far. We assume further gradations, in 
the form of a plausibility ordering of worlds as seen from some vantage point: 
 
  ≤i, s xy   in world s, agent i considers y at least as plausible as x. 
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Thus,  while  the  earlier  ranges  of  epistemic  alternatives  corresponded  to  the  strict 
information that we have, the same ranges ordered by plausibility give finer gradations. In 
particular, we now define belief semantically as 'truth in the most plausible options': 
 
M, s |= Biφ  iff M, t |=φ for all t which are maximal in the ordering λxy. ≤i, s xy. 
 
Here is an elementary example. Consider a model with two worlds that are epistemically 
accessible, but the one with ¬P considered more plausible than the other: 
 
    P  ≤  ¬P 
 
In this model, at the actual world where P holds, the agent does not know whether P, but 
she does (mistakenly!) believe that ¬P. It is crucial that our beliefs can be false. There are 
some technical complications in making this work in infinite models, but this is the idea.  
As with epistemic logic, there are complete doxastic logics and a whole theory around them 
(Fagin  et  al.  1995).  In  general  the  resulting  logics  also  analyze  the  interplay  between 
knowledge and belief, with information models having two relations ~i, ≤j which can be 
entangled in various ways, reflecting a stand on such issues as whether knowledge implies 
belief, or whether one knows one's beliefs. While inter-relations between attitudes toward 
information are an important topic, we focus on belief in what follows. 
 
Pre-encoding and conditional belief In doxastic logic, one soon finds that mere beliefs are 
not sufficient for explaining agents' behaviour. We want to know what they would do in 
certain scenarios where they receive new information. This requires conditional belief: 
 
M, s |= Bi (φ |ψ)   iff  M, t |=φ for all worlds t which   
are maximal for λxy. ≤i, s xy in the set {u | M, u |= ψ}. 
 
Conditional beliefs Bi (φ |ψ) are like logical conditionals in general, in that they express 
what might happen under different circumstances from where we are now. In particular, 
they pre-encode beliefs in φ that we would have if we were to learn new things ψ. The 
analogy is so close that conditional belief on reflexive transitive plausibility models and 
satisfies exactly the laws of the minimal conditional logic given by Burgess and Veltman. 
We will return to this setting later on when discussing the mechanics of belief revision.   12   
 
Hard and soft information Combined epistemic-doxastic-conditional logics also suggest a 
richer picture of incoming information. There is hard information in the current range of 
epistemically  accessible  worlds.  Next,  fine-structure  may  be  present  on  these  ranges, 
through  plausibility  orderings.  These  can  be  viewed  either  subjectively  as  representing 
agents' attitudes, or more objectively, as the result of receiving what might be called soft 
information making some proposition P more plausible, but not necessarily ruling out ¬P-
worlds. It is the total interplay of all these attitudes which describes our stances toward 
information, and the way they are affected by new incoming information. Thus, we get a 
mixture of information per se, and the ways in which agents take it – and this logical 
entanglement is such it is hard to say where one notion ends and the other begins. 
 
Changing beliefs  The dynamic process perspective on information change underlying PAL 
also applies to our beliefs, and how to revise these on the basis of incoming information. 
This involves changes, not in the range of available worlds or epistemic accessibility, but 
rather  in  the  plausibility  orderings  ≤i,  s  xy  among  worlds.  How  this  works  precisely, 
depends on the incoming signal. When we receive hard information !P, update will proceed 
by world elimination as before. We then get new beliefs related to our earlier conditional 
beliefs, and the counterpart to the above reduction axiom (d) are laws saying which new 
beliefs – and indeed, conditional beliefs – are acquired (van Benthem 2007B): 
 
Theorem 3  The logic of conditional belief under public announcements is axiomatized   
  completely by (a) any complete base logic of Bi(φ| ψ) for one’s chosen models,  
(b) PAL reduction axioms, plus (c) a reduction axiom for conditional beliefs: 
  [!P] Bi(φ| ψ)    ↔     P → Bi ( [!P]φ | P ∧ [!P]ψ) 
   
Hard information involves some interesting phenomena with belief. True information can 
be  misleading!  For  instance,  consider  this  model,  where  all  worlds  are  epistemically 
accessible, with a plausibility ordering 1 ≤ 2 ≤ 3. Here the agent believes that p in the 
actual world 1, but for the wrong reason, as she considers world 3 most plausible: 
   
  1 p, q      ≤  2  r    ≤  3 p, s   
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Now suppose that a true public announcement !¬s is made. This eliminates world 3, but in 
the remaining model with domain {1, 2: 
   
  1 p, q      ≤  2  r   
       
the agent now believes, incorrectly, that ¬p. Following Stalnaker, Baltag & Smets 2006 
have emphasized that there is room for another natural agent attitude here, viz. of safe 
belief, being those beliefs which cannot be changed by new true information. This provides 
an additional robustness to these beliefs, moving them closer to knowledge on an epistemic 
scale. Technically, safe beliefs are about those formulas φ which hold in all worlds that are 
least as plausible as the current one. Thus, a dynamic perspective on information change 
can also suggest new static epistemic-doxastic operators. 
   
Genuine belief revision Still, we are not yet dealing with genuine belief revision. The latter 
rather occurs with soft information concerning a proposition P, as mentioned above. This 
just increases our 'preference' for P-worlds, without totally abandoning the others. Soft 
information leads to plausibility change, not world elimination. This can come in various 
sorts. A quite typical 'belief revision policy' in this spirit is lexicographic upgrade ⇑P (Rott 
2005) which  replaces the current ordering relation ≤ between worlds by the following: all 
P-worlds become better than all ¬P-worlds, and within those two zones, the old ordering 
remains. Belief changes under such policies can be axiomatized completely in PAL-style. 
E.g., here is the logic for ⇑P revision (van Benthem 2007B). It looks complex – but after 
all, we are now describing a more subtle informational process than epistemic update: 
   
Theorem 4 The dynamic logic of lexicographic upgrade is axiomatized completely by  
  the logic of conditional belief + compositional analysis of effects of revision: 
[⇑P] q ↔ q,         [⇑P] ¬φ  ↔  ¬[⇑P]φ,  [⇑P] (φ∧ψ)  ↔  [⇑P]φ ∧ [⇑P]ψ 
[⇑P] B(φ|ψ)   ↔  (<>(P ∧ [⇑P]ψ ) ∧ B([⇑P]φ  | (P ∧ [⇑P]ψ ))  
                  ∨ (¬(<>(P ∧ [⇑P]ψ ) ∧ B([⇑P]φ  | [⇑P]ψ ))  
   
Here <> is the existential epistemic modality saying 'in some world of the current range'. 
Richer dynamic doxastic logics handle many further policies (cf. Baltag & Smets 2006,   14   
Baltag, van Ditmarsch & Moss 2007). There are also strong analogies between plausibility 
reordering and dynamic logics of preference change (van Benthem & Liu 2006). 
 
6  Inference and observation: 
   
Entanglement Let us now go back tot the original examples in Section 1. Actual planning 
and problem solving often involves an entanglement of two logical processes: inference 
and update. E.g., in solving a puzzle or playing a game, I update my current representation 
of the facts with new information (say, an observation of a card being played) and read off 
the new diagram, but I also quickly infer things from information already at my disposal. 
Likewise, philosophical accounts of intentional behaviour (Paul 2007) have stressed the 
interplay of internal inference making us better aware of what the intention involves, and 
relevant observations keeping us on track while following a plan of action. The dynamics 
of the two processes is quite different. While we have said a lot about update, we have said 
nothing at all about how to represent growth of information through inference steps.  
   
Information flow in inference Indeed, there is an issue here which has been labeled the 
‘scandal of deduction’. We all agree that inference can be informative – but in just which 
sense? Clearly the information states have to be more fine-grained now than sets of worlds. 
As we saw in Section 1, the conclusion in the inference ‘from A∨B, ¬A to B’ added nothing 
in terms of update to what the premises had already established. There is no consensus 
about  how  to  model  the  finer  grain  size,  though  interesting  proposals  exist  by  various 
authors cf. Allo 2007. In this section, we will take an extremely simple example, inspired 
by Jago 2006, and through his work, by logic programming. Consider information states 
consisting  of  sets  of  propositional  literals  (¬)p.  In  this  setting,  information  generating 
events are applications of Horn-clause rules of the form p1 & …, & pn → q. Thus, an initial 
information state might grow step-by-step as in the following example: 
   
  p, ¬q , r        (p & q) → s     p, ¬q , r, s       ( t & r) →  q       p, ¬q , r, s, ¬t 
   
A modal logic for this would have proof rules as action expressions, and we can then 
describe the modal theory of these sets of literals connected by labeled inference steps with 
operators  of  the  form  <rule>φ.  Starting  from  some  initial  set,  the  information  states   15   
obtained in this way may be viewed as partial descriptions of the set of all models in our 
earlier semantic sense satisfying the initial literals as well as all the Horn clause rules used 
in generating the further inferential information states.  
   
Two-level dynamic logics  Combining this perspective with the PAL paradigm, we can now 
have a two-stage procedure integrating inferential information flow with update through 
observation. For simplicity, take a propositional language: we omit subtleties of epistemic 
dynamic operators in this section. Also, we do not provide precise formal definitions, but 
merely sketch the main ideas. A semantic model is now built using valuations explicitly 
accepting or rejecting each proposition letter, i.e., complete worlds in the earlier sense for 
our simple language. But the model also specifies a family of inference rules R whose 
corresponding conditionals are valid in the given set of valuations. Finally, it has partial 
sets of literals X which do not yet decide every proposition letter. Each such set X stands in 
a compatibility relation with all total valuations V containing it. More precisely then,  
   
  A model M is a set of pairs (V, X) where X is a set of literals compatible with V, 
  together with a family R of Horn clause inference rules.  
   
One can think of this as an agent’s current semantic range (in the earlier sense) about the 
empirical facts in the actual world plus its current inferential approximations to the worlds 
in  it.  Of  course,  in  a  matching  logical  language,  we  will  need  to  have  suitable  static 
operators accessing both components. Here a knowledge operator Kϕ might operate on V 
components only, just as before. Next, one could access the X component by an operator Iϕ 
saying that the agent ‘realizes that ϕ‘ if the literal ϕ is actually present in X. In this setting, 
there are several natural kinds of informative action. First, consider ‘internal elucidation’: 
   
  Inferential steps do not change the V components of the current state,  
  but merely take some available rule and add literals to the current X  
  components where it applies (its premises are available).  
   
The second kind of action is the familiar running thread in this paper:  
   
  PAL-style public announcements !P, removing all states (V, X)  
  from the current one where V fails to satisfy P.    16   
   
But there may be other ‘intermediate’ actions with something of both. In particular, think 
of the act of seeing in some conscious sense. We can model this with  
   
  Explicit observations +q of literals q, which operate like !q, but then also  
  place q directly into all X components of pairs (V, X) in the remaining model.  
   
Putting all this into a language with dynamic modalities, we can make combined assertions 
which describe the fine-structure of these informational processes. E.g., 
   
  Ip →  [+q]<(p & q) → r>r 
   
says that, if the agent realizes that p in the current information state, and she then explicitly 
observes that q, then she can come to realize that r by explicitly performing an inference 
step  invoking the Horn clause rule (p & q) → r. This is just a simple example. But it does 
show that dynamic logics of both internal inferential elucidation and external observation 
make sense. A full-fledged logic with a language containing the above two static modalities 
Kϕ and Iϕ plus dynamic modalities for the above three informational actions remains to be 
developed in formal detail. But we trust the reader will have seen by now that this sort of 
mixed informational calculus is both a feasible and a worth-while endeavour. 
   
Cognitive architecture Two-level models seem closer to the actual working of the human 
mind,  where  different  processes  run  in  parallel,  as  has  been  pointed  out  by  cognitive 
psychologists. In particular, it has been suggested that belief formation involves some sort 
of inferential component (Velazquez 2007 proposes Peircean abduction for this purpose). 
Cf. the two-level view of pure information processing combined with belief formation on 
the basis of this information, where belief changes occur in a sort of 'reflective dynamics' in 
Rott 2007, tracking models at one level in terms of ‘belief bases’ at another.  
 
7  Games 
   
From logic to games  As was noted in Section 1, informational processes are dynamic, 
involving actions and events on  a par with static information structures. They are also 
social, as basic scenarios involve more than one agent, with notions of group knowledge 
crucial to understanding information flow. This dynamic social character of information   17   
comes together in the concept of intelligent interaction between agents (LogiCCC 2006). 
And interaction, of course, is the main topic investigated in game theory. There are many 
current interfaces between logic and game theory (de Bruin 2004, van Benthem 2005, van 
der Hoek & Pauly 2006), having to do with epistemic analysis of equilibrium solutions in 
terms  of  rational  action,  or  logical  analysis  of  games  as  a  paradigm  for  generalized 
interactive computation (Parikh 1985, Abramsky 2007). Here we merely mention a few 
appealing interfaces which are related to introducing public announcements. What happens 
in dynamic scenarios of information flow where games can change?  
   
Promises  and  intentions  The  famous  game-theoretic  solution  procedure  of  Backward 
Induction solution (BI) for extensive games often produces ‘bad equilibria’ representing 
some ‘socially’ undesirable outcome. An example is given to the left in the following 
picture, where the bad equilibrium (1, 0) predicted by reasoning about players’ ‘rationality’ 
makes both hugely worse of than the cooperative outcome (99, 99). One way of doing 
something about this, following van Benthem 2007C, is by making promises. These may 
be viewed as public announcements of intentions. E.g., E might promise that she will not 
go left, changing the game to the new one depicted on the right– and the new equilibrium 
(99, 99) results, making both players better off by restricting the freedom of one of them! 
   
        A              A 
 
     1, 0    E      1. 0       E 
 
      0, 100       99, 99        99, 99 
   
But one can also announce other things. Van Otterloo 2005 has a more general logic of 
players’ strategic powers and preferences, where models change through announcement of 
players intentions. Complete logics for such systems arise from intertwining PAL as above 
with modal logics of actions and preferences, in a relatively straightforward manner. 
   
 ‘Rational Dynamics’ Van Benthem 2003 uses public announcement to analyze further 
solution procedures. Strategic games induce epistemic models M of strategy profiles with 
preferences and uncertainty relations for players who know their own strategy, but not that   18   
of the others – and they have their own solution procedures, such as Iterated Removal of 
Strictly Dominated Strategies. Then a combined modal-preference language can formulate 
statements of Weak Rationality ("no player chooses a move which she knows to be worse 
than some other available one") and Strong Rationality ("every player chooses a move 
which she thinks may be the best possible one"). When announced, these eliminate worlds, 
and iterating this, one finds a smallest sub-model where announcements have no further 
effect: WR or SR are now common knowledge. 
   
Theorem 5    The result of iterated announcement of WR is the usual solution concept  
of Iterated Removal of Strictly Dominated Strategies; and it is definable inside  
M by means of a formula of a modal µ–calculus with inflationary fixed-points. 
The same for iterated announcement of SR and game-theoretic Rationalizability.  
   
If A has ‘existential-positive’ syntax (SR does), the definition is in a standard µ–calculus. In 
this scenario of 'internal deliberation' players keep recalling their rationality. But one can 
announce many other statements. A similar analysis applies to extensive games: 
   
Theorem 6    The Backward Induction solution for extensive games is obtained through 
repeated announcement of the assertion "no player chooses a move all of whose  
further histories end worse than all histories after some other available move". 
   
Here is how this works out for a Centipede game, with branches indicated by name: 
   
    A     E     A            u 
 
     x       y        z 
 
Stage 0: rule out u, Stage 1: rule out z, Stage 3: rule out y. 
 
The procedure ends in largest sub-models where players have common belief of rationality. 
 
Again, there are other announcement options than the ruthless egotism of BI. Van Benthem 
2003  discusses  history-oriented  announcements,  where  players  steer  future  actions  by 
reminding themselves of the legitimate rights of others, because of ‘past favours received’.  
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Excursion: strategies Games are not just about single moves, but also about longer-term 
interactive strategies. If we use propositional dynamic logic PDL for strategies and moves 
in games (cf. van Benthem 2002), this leads to the obvious logic PDL+PAL adding public 
announcements [!A]. It is easy to show that PDL is closed under relativization to definable 
sub-models, both in its propositional and its program parts, using an operation π|A for 
programs π which basically wraps them in tests ?A.  
 
Theorem 7   PDL+ PAL is axiomatized by merging their separate laws while adding  
  the following reduction axiom: [!A]{σ} φ ↔ (A → {σ|A}[!A]φ).  
 
Of course, there is more structure to games than just moves and strategies, and PAL-style 
announcement scenarios also make sense with combined epistemic preference languages. 
 
8  Further examples and further directions 
 
More public dynamics Our discussion has by no means exhausted the potential for adding 
public announcement operators to existing logics, making their underlying mechanisms of 
information flow explicit. Without much further elaboration, we mention a final example 
which seems well-worth exploring. Inspired by earlier work by Yamada, van Benthem & 
Liu 2006 consider preference changes due to commands or suggestions, and interleave this 
with new information via public announcement. One setting where this combination occurs 
is in social choice theory, when analyzing voting patterns. Mathematical frameworks in 
this  area  usually  consider  just  preference  aggregation  functions,  proving  constraints  on 
what criteria these can satisfy. But in reality, there is a stepwise dynamics to this process. 
Prior to voting, there is deliberation, with incoming new information. And this information 
can affect agents’ preferences in various ways. E.g., if my preferences are for things which 
I consider most plausible in terms of my beliefs, then new factual information can change 
my beliefs and hence also my preferences. I wanted to vote for a party promising Golden 
Mountains, but when I learn that no such geological formations exist, I change my vote. 
And there are even more subtle phenomena. Learning about other people’s preferences can 
also  be  relevant,  e.g.,  when  I  want  to  align  my  votes  with  theirs.  This  is  why  in 
deliberation, so-called ‘straw votes’ are useful, telling us in a preliminary manner how the   20   
preferences of the other participants lie. Deliberation and voting seems to be a rich source 
of experience, which invites logical formalization involving both static epistemic/doxastic 
preference languages, and mechanisms which input new information about the empirical 
facts,  and  about  other  agents  involved.  Adding  public  announcement  to  social  choice 
theory  seems  an  excellent  initial  step  toward  combining  ‘top-down’  analysis  of  voting 
procedures with ‘bottom-up’ accounts of procedural justice and rational deliberation. 
 
Broader frameworks There are many further strands in the current literature extending 
public announcement as a mechanism of information flow. E.g., often agents have only 
partial powers of observation. General dynamic-epistemic logics (Baltag, Moss & Solecki 
1998,  van  Benthem,  van  Eijck  &  Kooi  2006)  work  with  ‘event  models’  A  describing 
complex scenarios where agents have different observational access. So-called ‘product 
update’ then turns a current model M into a model MxA recording information of different 
agents. Product update redefines the universe of relevant possible worlds, and the epistemic 
accessibility relations between them. Conversations, games, internet transactions, and other 
real activities are like this. Other structures arise when we pay attention to computational 
program structures in conversation, which involve sequential composition, guarded choice, 
iteration,  and  even  parallel  composition.  Van  Benthem  2007A  discusses  how  one  can 
combine all this with explicit logic to give an account of intelligent interaction between 
rational agents. Next, as for the longer term, there are epistemic-temporal logics describing 
universes  of  all  possible  temporal  evolutions  of  informational  processes,  used  in 
philosophical logic, computational logics, game logics, learning theory, situation calculus, 
belief  revision,  and  other  areas.  Van  Benthem  &  Pacuit  2006  is  a  survey  of  the  vast 
literature drawing many strands together. 
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